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FW: [AERNet] excellent unanimous Supreme Court decision about service animals just handed down!

AC
Anthony Candela
Wed, Feb 22, 2017 6:29 PM

Thanks to Mark for disseminating this to the AER list.  I would add to
Mark's synopsis that if a suit is brought on the basis of denial of access
(i.e., "you cannot have that service animal in our school") and no claim is
being made that a free and public education is being denied, then the IDEA
administrative string can be bypassed.  The lesson I picked up, but could be
wrong, is that it must be made clear all the way from the start that denial
of a FAPE is not the issue but that access, the same as if it were any other
public place, is the issue.  I believe the Supreme Court remanded the case
of EF back to an appellate court with instructions to make sure the parents
are not also and interwoven claiming denial of a FAPE.  Mark, double-check
my understanding here. In any case and just as Mark said, this is a great
decision.

Tony

-----Original Message-----
From: AERNet [mailto:aernet-bounces@lists.aerbvi.org] On Behalf Of Mark
Richert
Sent: Wednesday, February 22, 2017 12:14 PM
To: aernet@lists.aerbvi.org
Subject: [AERNet] excellent unanimous Supreme Court decision about service
animals just handed down!

All, in these very strange and mysterious days, it's awesome to see a
unanimous Supreme Court decision having to do with an issue we all care so
much about. This decision just came out like a couple hours ago, very cool.
I'll share the syllabus from the Court's decision below, but the bottom line
is that if a school discriminates against a kiddo for using a guide
dog/service animal, the parents should be able to go straight to court to
enforce the student's rights under ADA and 504 and do not need to exhaust
all the administrative procedures you have to satisfy under IDEA. The
formatting of the syllabus is a bit funky cuz I just cut and pasted it from
the PDF slip opinion.

Mark

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Syllabus
FRY ET VIR, AS NEXT FRIENDS OF MINOR E. F. v.
NAPOLEON COMMUNITY SCHOOLS ET AL.
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT No.
15­497. Argued October 31, 2016—Decided February 22, 2017 The Individuals
with Disabilities Education Act
(IDEA) offers federal funds to States in exchange for a commitment to
furnish a “free appropriate public education” (FAPE) to children with
certain disabilities, 20 U. S. C. §1412(a)(1)(A), and establishes formal
administrativeprocedures for resolving disputes between parents and schools
concerning the provision of a FAPE. Other federal statutes also protect the
interests of children with disabilities, including Title II of theAmericans
with Disabilities Act
(ADA) and §504 of the RehabilitationAct. In Smith v. Robinson, 468 U. S.
992, this Court considered the interaction between those other laws and the
IDEA, holding that theIDEA was “the exclusive avenue” through which a child
with a disability could challenge the adequacy of his education. Id., at
1009.
Congress responded by passing the Handicapped Children’s Protection Act of
1986, overturning Smith’s preclusion of non-IDEA claims and adding a
carefully defined exhaustion provision. Under that provision, a plaintiff
bringing suit under the ADA, the RehabilitationAct, or similar laws “seeking
relief that is also available under [theIDEA]” must first exhaust the IDEA’s
administrative procedures. §1415(l).Petitioner E.
F. is a child with a severe form of cerebral palsy; a trained service dog
named Wonder assists her with various daily life activities. When E. F.’s
parents, petitioners Stacy and Brent Fry,sought permission for Wonder to
join E. F. in kindergarten, officialsat Ezra Eby Elementary School refused.
The officials reasoned that the human aide provided as part of E. F.’s
individualized educationprogram rendered the dog superfluous. In response,
the Frys removed E.
F. from Ezra Eby and began homeschooling her. They also Syllabus filed a
complaint with the Department of Education’s Office for CivilRights (OCR),
claiming that the exclusion of E. F.’s service animal violated her rights
under Title II and §504. OCR agreed, and school officials invited E. F. to
return to Ezra Eby with Wonder. But the Frys, concerned about resentment
from school officials, instead enrolled E. F. in a different school that
welcomed the service dog. The Frysthen filed this suit in federal court
against Ezra Eby’s local and regional school districts and principal
(collectively, the school districts),alleging that they violated Title II
and §504 and seeking declaratoryand monetary relief. The District Court
granted the school districts’ motion to dismiss the suit, holding that
§1415(l) required the Frys tofirst exhaust the IDEA’s administrative
procedures.
The Sixth Circuit affirmed, reasoning that
§1415(l) applies whenever a plaintiff’s alleged harms are “educational” in
nature.
Held:

  1. Exhaustion of the IDEA’s administrative procedures is unnecessary where
    the gravamen of the plaintiff’s suit is something otherthan the denial of
    the IDEA’s core guarantee of a FAPE. Pp. 9­18.
    list of 2 items
    (a)
    The language of §1415(l) compels exhaustion when a plaintiffseeks “relief”
    that is “available”
    under the IDEA. Establishing the scope of §1415(l), then, requires
    identifying the circumstances inwhich the IDEA enables a person to obtain
    redress or access a benefit. That inquiry immediately reveals the primacy of
    a FAPE in thestatutory scheme. The IDEA’s stated purpose and specific
    commands center on ensuring a FAPE for children with disabilities. And the
    IDEA’s administrative procedures test whether a school has met
    thisobligation: Any decision by a hearing officer on a request for
    substantive relief “shall” be “based on a determination of whether the child
    received a free appropriate public education.”
    §1415(f)(3)(E)(i). Accordingly, §1415(l)’s exhaustion rule hinges on whether
    a lawsuit seeks relief for the denial of a FAPE. If a lawsuit charges such a
    denial, the plaintiff cannot escape §1415(l) merely by bringing the suit
    under a statute other than the IDEA. But if the remedy sought in a suit
    brought under a different statute is not for the denial of a FAPE,then
    exhaustion of the IDEA’s procedures is not required. Pp. 9­13.
    (b)
    In determining whether a plaintiff seeks relief for the denial of a FAPE,
    what matters is the gravamen of the plaintiff’s complaint,setting aside any
    attempts at artful pleading. That inquiry makes central the plaintiff’s own
    claims, as §1415(l) explicitly requires inasking whether a lawsuit in fact
    “seeks” relief available under the IDEA. But examination of a plaintiff’s
    complaint should consider substance, not surface: §1415(l) requires
    exhaustion when the gravamen of a complaint seeks redress for a school’s
    failure to provide a FAPE, even if not phrased or framed in precisely that
    way. In ad list end Syllabus dressing whether a complaint fits that
    description, a court should attend to the diverse means and ends of the
    statutes covering persons with disabilities.
    The IDEA guarantees individually tailored educational services for children
    with disabilities, while Title II and §504promise nondiscriminatory access
    to public institutions for peoplewith disabilities of all ages. That is not
    to deny some overlap in coverage: The same conduct might violate all three
    statutes. But still, these statutory differences mean that a complaint
    brought under Title II and
    §504 might instead seek relief for simple discrimination, irrespective of
    the IDEA’s FAPE obligation. One clue to the gravamen of a complaint can come
    from asking a pair of hypothetical questions.First, could the plaintiff have
    brought essentially the same claim if the alleged conduct had occurred at a
    public facility that was not aschool? Second, could an adult at the school
    have pressed essentiallythe same grievance? When the answer to those
    questions is yes, a complaint that does not expressly allege the denial of a
    FAPE is alsounlikely to be truly about that subject. But when the answer is
    no, then the complaint probably does concern a FAPE. A further sign of the
    gravamen of a suit can emerge from the history of the proceedings. Prior
    pursuit of the IDEA’s administrative remedies may provide strong evidence
    that the substance of a plaintiff’s claim concernsthe denial of a FAPE, even
    if the complaint never explicitly uses that term. Pp. 13­18.
  2. This case is remanded to the Court of Appeals for a proper analysis of
    whether the gravamen of E. F.’s complaint charges, and seeksrelief for, the
    denial of a FAPE. The Frys’ complaint alleges only dis-ability-based
    discrimination, without making any reference to the adequacy of the special
    education services E. F.’s school provided.Instead, the Frys have maintained
    that the school districts infringed E. F.’s right to equal access—even if
    their actions complied in fullwith the IDEA’s requirements. But the
    possibility remains that thehistory of these proceedings might suggest
    something different.
    The parties have not addressed whether the Frys initially pursued theIDEA’s
    administrative remedies, and the record is cloudy as to the relevant facts.
    On remand, the court below should establish whether (or to what extent) the
    Frys invoked the IDEA’s dispute resolutionprocess before filing suit. And if
    the Frys started down that road, thecourt should decide whether their
    actions reveal that the gravamen of their complaint is indeed the denial of
    a FAPE, thus necessitating further exhaustion. Pp. 18­20.
    788 F. 3d 622, vacated and remanded.
    KAGAN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J., and
    KENNEDY, GINSBURG, BREYER, and SOTOMAYOR, JJ., joined.
    FRY v. NAPOLEON COMMUNITY SCHOOLS Syllabus ALITO, J., filed an opinion
    concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, in which THOMAS, J.,
    joined.

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Thanks to Mark for disseminating this to the AER list. I would add to Mark's synopsis that if a suit is brought on the basis of denial of access (i.e., "you cannot have that service animal in our school") and no claim is being made that a free and public education is being denied, then the IDEA administrative string can be bypassed. The lesson I picked up, but could be wrong, is that it must be made clear all the way from the start that denial of a FAPE is not the issue but that access, the same as if it were any other public place, is the issue. I believe the Supreme Court remanded the case of EF back to an appellate court with instructions to make sure the parents are not also and interwoven claiming denial of a FAPE. Mark, double-check my understanding here. In any case and just as Mark said, this is a great decision. Tony -----Original Message----- From: AERNet [mailto:aernet-bounces@lists.aerbvi.org] On Behalf Of Mark Richert Sent: Wednesday, February 22, 2017 12:14 PM To: aernet@lists.aerbvi.org Subject: [AERNet] excellent unanimous Supreme Court decision about service animals just handed down! All, in these very strange and mysterious days, it's awesome to see a unanimous Supreme Court decision having to do with an issue we all care so much about. This decision just came out like a couple hours ago, very cool. I'll share the syllabus from the Court's decision below, but the bottom line is that if a school discriminates against a kiddo for using a guide dog/service animal, the parents should be able to go straight to court to enforce the student's rights under ADA and 504 and do not need to exhaust all the administrative procedures you have to satisfy under IDEA. The formatting of the syllabus is a bit funky cuz I just cut and pasted it from the PDF slip opinion. Mark ---- SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES Syllabus FRY ET VIR, AS NEXT FRIENDS OF MINOR E. F. v. NAPOLEON COMMUNITY SCHOOLS ET AL. CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT No. 15­497. Argued October 31, 2016—Decided February 22, 2017 The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) offers federal funds to States in exchange for a commitment to furnish a “free appropriate public education” (FAPE) to children with certain disabilities, 20 U. S. C. §1412(a)(1)(A), and establishes formal administrativeprocedures for resolving disputes between parents and schools concerning the provision of a FAPE. Other federal statutes also protect the interests of children with disabilities, including Title II of theAmericans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and §504 of the RehabilitationAct. In Smith v. Robinson, 468 U. S. 992, this Court considered the interaction between those other laws and the IDEA, holding that theIDEA was “the exclusive avenue” through which a child with a disability could challenge the adequacy of his education. Id., at 1009. Congress responded by passing the Handicapped Children’s Protection Act of 1986, overturning Smith’s preclusion of non-IDEA claims and adding a carefully defined exhaustion provision. Under that provision, a plaintiff bringing suit under the ADA, the RehabilitationAct, or similar laws “seeking relief that is also available under [theIDEA]” must first exhaust the IDEA’s administrative procedures. §1415(l).Petitioner E. F. is a child with a severe form of cerebral palsy; a trained service dog named Wonder assists her with various daily life activities. When E. F.’s parents, petitioners Stacy and Brent Fry,sought permission for Wonder to join E. F. in kindergarten, officialsat Ezra Eby Elementary School refused. The officials reasoned that the human aide provided as part of E. F.’s individualized educationprogram rendered the dog superfluous. In response, the Frys removed E. F. from Ezra Eby and began homeschooling her. They also Syllabus filed a complaint with the Department of Education’s Office for CivilRights (OCR), claiming that the exclusion of E. F.’s service animal violated her rights under Title II and §504. OCR agreed, and school officials invited E. F. to return to Ezra Eby with Wonder. But the Frys, concerned about resentment from school officials, instead enrolled E. F. in a different school that welcomed the service dog. The Frysthen filed this suit in federal court against Ezra Eby’s local and regional school districts and principal (collectively, the school districts),alleging that they violated Title II and §504 and seeking declaratoryand monetary relief. The District Court granted the school districts’ motion to dismiss the suit, holding that §1415(l) required the Frys tofirst exhaust the IDEA’s administrative procedures. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, reasoning that §1415(l) applies whenever a plaintiff’s alleged harms are “educational” in nature. Held: 1. Exhaustion of the IDEA’s administrative procedures is unnecessary where the gravamen of the plaintiff’s suit is something otherthan the denial of the IDEA’s core guarantee of a FAPE. Pp. 9­18. list of 2 items (a) The language of §1415(l) compels exhaustion when a plaintiffseeks “relief” that is “available” under the IDEA. Establishing the scope of §1415(l), then, requires identifying the circumstances inwhich the IDEA enables a person to obtain redress or access a benefit. That inquiry immediately reveals the primacy of a FAPE in thestatutory scheme. The IDEA’s stated purpose and specific commands center on ensuring a FAPE for children with disabilities. And the IDEA’s administrative procedures test whether a school has met thisobligation: Any decision by a hearing officer on a request for substantive relief “shall” be “based on a determination of whether the child received a free appropriate public education.” §1415(f)(3)(E)(i). Accordingly, §1415(l)’s exhaustion rule hinges on whether a lawsuit seeks relief for the denial of a FAPE. If a lawsuit charges such a denial, the plaintiff cannot escape §1415(l) merely by bringing the suit under a statute other than the IDEA. But if the remedy sought in a suit brought under a different statute is not for the denial of a FAPE,then exhaustion of the IDEA’s procedures is not required. Pp. 9­13. (b) In determining whether a plaintiff seeks relief for the denial of a FAPE, what matters is the gravamen of the plaintiff’s complaint,setting aside any attempts at artful pleading. That inquiry makes central the plaintiff’s own claims, as §1415(l) explicitly requires inasking whether a lawsuit in fact “seeks” relief available under the IDEA. But examination of a plaintiff’s complaint should consider substance, not surface: §1415(l) requires exhaustion when the gravamen of a complaint seeks redress for a school’s failure to provide a FAPE, even if not phrased or framed in precisely that way. In ad list end Syllabus dressing whether a complaint fits that description, a court should attend to the diverse means and ends of the statutes covering persons with disabilities. The IDEA guarantees individually tailored educational services for children with disabilities, while Title II and §504promise nondiscriminatory access to public institutions for peoplewith disabilities of all ages. That is not to deny some overlap in coverage: The same conduct might violate all three statutes. But still, these statutory differences mean that a complaint brought under Title II and §504 might instead seek relief for simple discrimination, irrespective of the IDEA’s FAPE obligation. One clue to the gravamen of a complaint can come from asking a pair of hypothetical questions.First, could the plaintiff have brought essentially the same claim if the alleged conduct had occurred at a public facility that was not aschool? Second, could an adult at the school have pressed essentiallythe same grievance? When the answer to those questions is yes, a complaint that does not expressly allege the denial of a FAPE is alsounlikely to be truly about that subject. But when the answer is no, then the complaint probably does concern a FAPE. A further sign of the gravamen of a suit can emerge from the history of the proceedings. Prior pursuit of the IDEA’s administrative remedies may provide strong evidence that the substance of a plaintiff’s claim concernsthe denial of a FAPE, even if the complaint never explicitly uses that term. Pp. 13­18. 2. This case is remanded to the Court of Appeals for a proper analysis of whether the gravamen of E. F.’s complaint charges, and seeksrelief for, the denial of a FAPE. The Frys’ complaint alleges only dis-ability-based discrimination, without making any reference to the adequacy of the special education services E. F.’s school provided.Instead, the Frys have maintained that the school districts infringed E. F.’s right to equal access—even if their actions complied in fullwith the IDEA’s requirements. But the possibility remains that thehistory of these proceedings might suggest something different. The parties have not addressed whether the Frys initially pursued theIDEA’s administrative remedies, and the record is cloudy as to the relevant facts. On remand, the court below should establish whether (or to what extent) the Frys invoked the IDEA’s dispute resolutionprocess before filing suit. And if the Frys started down that road, thecourt should decide whether their actions reveal that the gravamen of their complaint is indeed the denial of a FAPE, thus necessitating further exhaustion. Pp. 18­20. 788 F. 3d 622, vacated and remanded. KAGAN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J., and KENNEDY, GINSBURG, BREYER, and SOTOMAYOR, JJ., joined. FRY v. NAPOLEON COMMUNITY SCHOOLS Syllabus ALITO, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, in which THOMAS, J., joined. You are subscribed to AERNet, The Association for Education and Rehabilitation of the Blind and Visually Impaired Listserv. To post a message to all the list members, send an email to aernet@lists.aerbvi.org. Address list requests to: aernet-request@lists.aerbvi.org To unsubscribe from this list, go to http://lists.aerbvi.org/mailman/listinfo/aernet_lists.aerbvi.org and follow instructions to unsubscribe. Go to the same address to access the list archives. _______________________________________________ AERNet mailing list AERNet@lists.aerbvi.org http://lists.aerbvi.org/mailman/listinfo/aernet_lists.aerbvi.org ____________________________________________________________ Husband Divorced His Wife After Looking Closer At This Photo jumpvibes.com http://thirdpartyoffers.juno.com/TGL3141/58add89476e6e589474ddst02duc