All, in these very strange and mysterious days,
it's awesome to see a unanimous Supreme Court
decision having to do with an issue we all care
so much about. This decision just came out like a
couple hours ago, very cool. I'll share the
syllabus from the Court's decision below, but the
bottom line is that if a school discriminates
against a kiddo for using a guide dog/service
animal, the parents should be able to go straight
to court to enforce the student's rights under
ADA and 504 and do not need to exhaust all the
administrative procedures you have to satisfy
under IDEA. The formatting of the syllabus is a
bit funky cuz I just cut and pasted it from the PDF slip opinion.

Mark

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Syllabus
FRY ET VIR, AS NEXT FRIENDS OF MINOR E. F. v.
NAPOLEON COMMUNITY SCHOOLS ET AL.
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
No. 15­497. Argued October 31, 2016—Decided February 22, 2017
The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act
(IDEA) offers federal funds to States in exchange
for a commitment to furnish a “free appropriate public
education” (FAPE) to children with certain
disabilities, 20 U. S. C. §1412(a)(1)(A), and
establishes formal administrativeprocedures for resolving disputes
between parents and schools concerning the
provision of a FAPE. Other federal statutes also
protect the interests of children with disabilities, including
Title II of theAmericans with Disabilities Act
(ADA) and §504 of the RehabilitationAct. In Smith
v. Robinson, 468 U. S. 992, this Court considered the
interaction between those other laws and the
IDEA, holding that theIDEA was “the exclusive
avenue” through which a child with a disability could challenge
the adequacy of his education. Id., at 1009.
Congress responded by passing the Handicapped
Children’s Protection Act of 1986, overturning Smith’s preclusion
of non-IDEA claims and adding a carefully defined
exhaustion provision. Under that provision, a
plaintiff bringing suit under the ADA, the RehabilitationAct,
or similar laws “seeking relief that is also
available under [theIDEA]” must first exhaust the
IDEA’s administrative procedures. §1415(l).Petitioner E.
F. is a child with a severe form of cerebral
palsy; a trained service dog named Wonder assists
her with various daily life activities. When E. F.’s parents,
petitioners Stacy and Brent Fry,sought permission
for Wonder to join E. F. in kindergarten,
officialsat Ezra Eby Elementary School refused. The officials
reasoned that the human aide provided as part of
E. F.’s individualized educationprogram rendered
the dog superfluous. In response, the Frys removed E.
F. from Ezra Eby and began homeschooling her. They also
Syllabus
filed a complaint with the Department of
Education’s Office for CivilRights (OCR),
claiming that the exclusion of E. F.’s service animal violated her rights
under Title II and §504. OCR agreed, and school
officials invited E. F. to return to Ezra Eby
with Wonder. But the Frys, concerned about resentment from
school officials, instead enrolled
E. F. in a different school that welcomed the
service dog. The Frysthen filed this suit in
federal court against Ezra Eby’s local and regional school districts
and principal (collectively, the school
districts),alleging that they violated Title II
and §504 and seeking declaratoryand monetary relief. The District
Court granted the school districts’ motion to
dismiss the suit, holding that §1415(l) required
the Frys tofirst exhaust the IDEA’s administrative procedures.
The Sixth Circuit affirmed, reasoning that
§1415(l) applies whenever a plaintiff’s alleged
harms are “educational” in nature.
Held:

1. Exhaustion of the IDEA’s administrative
   procedures is unnecessary where the gravamen of
   the plaintiff’s suit is something otherthan the denial of the
   IDEA’s core guarantee of a FAPE. Pp. 9­18.
   list of 2 items
   (a)
   The language of §1415(l) compels exhaustion when
   a plaintiffseeks “relief” that is “available”
   under the IDEA. Establishing the scope of §1415(l), then,
   requires identifying the circumstances inwhich
   the IDEA enables a person to obtain redress or
   access a benefit. That inquiry immediately reveals the primacy
   of a FAPE in thestatutory scheme. The IDEA’s
   stated purpose and specific commands center on
   ensuring a FAPE for children with disabilities. And the IDEA’s
   administrative procedures test whether a school
   has met thisobligation: Any decision by a hearing
   officer on a request for substantive relief “shall” be
   “based on a determination of whether the child
   received a free appropriate public education.”
   §1415(f)(3)(E)(i). Accordingly, §1415(l)’s exhaustion rule
   hinges on whether a lawsuit seeks relief for the
   denial of a FAPE. If a lawsuit charges such a
   denial, the plaintiff cannot escape §1415(l) merely by bringing
   the suit under a statute other than the IDEA. But
   if the remedy sought in a suit brought under a
   different statute is not for the denial of a FAPE,then
   exhaustion of the IDEA’s procedures is not required. Pp. 9­13.
   (b)
   In determining whether a plaintiff seeks relief
   for the denial of a FAPE, what matters is the
   gravamen of the plaintiff’s complaint,setting aside any attempts
   at artful pleading. That inquiry makes central
   the plaintiff’s own claims, as §1415(l)
   explicitly requires inasking whether a lawsuit in fact “seeks” relief
   available under the IDEA. But examination of a
   plaintiff’s complaint should consider substance,
   not surface: §1415(l) requires exhaustion when the gravamen
   of a complaint seeks redress for a school’s
   failure to provide a FAPE, even if not phrased or
   framed in precisely that way. In ad
   list end
   Syllabus
   dressing whether a complaint fits that
   description, a court should attend to the diverse
   means and ends of the statutes covering persons with disabilities.
   The IDEA guarantees individually tailored
   educational services for children with
   disabilities, while Title II and §504promise nondiscriminatory access
   to public institutions for peoplewith
   disabilities of all ages. That is not to deny
   some overlap in coverage: The same conduct might violate all three
   statutes. But still, these statutory differences
   mean that a complaint brought under Title II and
   §504 might instead seek relief for simple discrimination,
   irrespective of the IDEA’s FAPE obligation. One
   clue to the gravamen of a complaint can come from
   asking a pair of hypothetical questions.First, could
   the plaintiff have brought essentially the same
   claim if the alleged conduct had occurred at a
   public facility that was not aschool? Second, could an adult
   at the school have pressed essentiallythe same
   grievance? When the answer to those questions is
   yes, a complaint that does not expressly allege the denial
   of a FAPE is alsounlikely to be truly about that
   subject. But when the answer is no, then the
   complaint probably does concern a FAPE. A further sign of
   the gravamen of a suit can emerge from the
   history of the proceedings. Prior pursuit of the
   IDEA’s administrative remedies may provide strong evidence
   that the substance of a plaintiff’s claim
   concernsthe denial of a FAPE, even if the
   complaint never explicitly uses that term. Pp. 13­18.
2. This case is remanded to the Court of Appeals
   for a proper analysis of whether the gravamen of
   E. F.’s complaint charges, and seeksrelief for, the denial
   of a FAPE. The Frys’ complaint alleges only
   dis-ability-based discrimination, without making
   any reference to the adequacy of the special education services
   E. F.’s school provided.Instead, the Frys have
   maintained that the school districts infringed
   E. F.’s right to equal access—even if their
   actions complied in fullwith the IDEA’s
   requirements. But the possibility remains that thehistory of these
   proceedings might suggest something different.
   The parties have not addressed whether the Frys
   initially pursued theIDEA’s administrative remedies, and
   the record is cloudy as to the relevant facts. On
   remand, the court below should establish whether
   (or to what extent) the Frys invoked the IDEA’s dispute
   resolutionprocess before filing suit. And if the
   Frys started down that road, thecourt should
   decide whether their actions reveal that the gravamen of
   their complaint is indeed the denial of a FAPE,
   thus necessitating further exhaustion. Pp. 18­20.
   788 F. 3d 622, vacated and remanded.
   KAGAN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS,
   C. J., and KENNEDY, GINSBURG, BREYER, and SOTOMAYOR, JJ., joined.
   FRY v. NAPOLEON COMMUNITY SCHOOLS Syllabus ALITO,
   J., filed an opinion concurring in part and
   concurring in the judgment, in which THOMAS, J., joined.

Thank you for sharing this, Mark! Wow.
Laura

Laura Bozeman, Ph.D., COMS, CLVT
Associate Professor/Director: Vision Studies
School for Global Inclusion and Social Development
UMass Boston
100 Morrissey Blvd. Bayside Center Room 428
Boston, MA 02125
Laura.bozeman@umb.edu
www.nercve.org
617-287-4385
Fax 617-287-7727

On 2/22/17, 12:13 PM, "AERNet on behalf of Mark Richert" <aernet-bounces@lists.aerbvi.org on behalf of 4justice@concentric.net> wrote:

All, in these very strange and mysterious days, 
it's awesome to see a unanimous Supreme Court 
decision having to do with an issue we all care 
so much about. This decision just came out like a 
couple hours ago, very cool. I'll share the 
syllabus from the Court's decision below, but the 
bottom line is that if a school discriminates 
against a kiddo for using a guide dog/service 
animal, the parents should be able to go straight 
to court to enforce the student's rights under 
ADA and 504 and do not need to exhaust all the 
administrative procedures you have to satisfy 
under IDEA. The formatting of the syllabus is a 
bit funky cuz I just cut and pasted it from the PDF slip opinion.

Mark
----
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Syllabus
FRY ET VIR, AS NEXT FRIENDS OF MINOR E. F. v. 
NAPOLEON COMMUNITY SCHOOLS ET AL.
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
No. 15­497. Argued October 31, 2016—Decided February 22, 2017
The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act 
(IDEA) offers federal funds to States in exchange 
for a commitment to furnish a “free appropriate public
education” (FAPE) to children with certain 
disabilities, 20 U. S. C. §1412(a)(1)(A), and 
establishes formal administrativeprocedures for resolving disputes
between parents and schools concerning the 
provision of a FAPE. Other federal statutes also 
protect the interests of children with disabilities, including
Title II of theAmericans with Disabilities Act 
(ADA) and §504 of the RehabilitationAct. In Smith 
v. Robinson, 468 U. S. 992, this Court considered the
interaction between those other laws and the 
IDEA, holding that theIDEA was “the exclusive 
avenue” through which a child with a disability could challenge
the adequacy of his education. Id., at 1009. 
Congress responded by passing the Handicapped 
Children’s Protection Act of 1986, overturning Smith’s preclusion
of non-IDEA claims and adding a carefully defined 
exhaustion provision. Under that provision, a 
plaintiff bringing suit under the ADA, the RehabilitationAct,
or similar laws “seeking relief that is also 
available under [theIDEA]” must first exhaust the 
IDEA’s administrative procedures. §1415(l).Petitioner E.
F. is a child with a severe form of cerebral 
palsy; a trained service dog named Wonder assists 
her with various daily life activities. When E. F.’s parents,
petitioners Stacy and Brent Fry,sought permission 
for Wonder to join E. F. in kindergarten, 
officialsat Ezra Eby Elementary School refused. The officials
reasoned that the human aide provided as part of 
E. F.’s individualized educationprogram rendered 
the dog superfluous. In response, the Frys removed E.
F. from Ezra Eby and began homeschooling her. They also
Syllabus
filed a complaint with the Department of 
Education’s Office for CivilRights (OCR), 
claiming that the exclusion of E. F.’s service animal violated her rights
under Title II and §504. OCR agreed, and school 
officials invited E. F. to return to Ezra Eby 
with Wonder. But the Frys, concerned about resentment from
school officials, instead enrolled
E. F. in a different school that welcomed the 
service dog. The Frysthen filed this suit in 
federal court against Ezra Eby’s local and regional school districts
and principal (collectively, the school 
districts),alleging that they violated Title II 
and §504 and seeking declaratoryand monetary relief. The District
Court granted the school districts’ motion to 
dismiss the suit, holding that §1415(l) required 
the Frys tofirst exhaust the IDEA’s administrative procedures.
The Sixth Circuit affirmed, reasoning that 
§1415(l) applies whenever a plaintiff’s alleged 
harms are “educational” in nature.
Held:
1. Exhaustion of the IDEA’s administrative 
procedures is unnecessary where the gravamen of 
the plaintiff’s suit is something otherthan the denial of the
IDEA’s core guarantee of a FAPE. Pp. 9­18.
list of 2 items
(a)
The language of §1415(l) compels exhaustion when 
a plaintiffseeks “relief” that is “available” 
under the IDEA. Establishing the scope of §1415(l), then,
requires identifying the circumstances inwhich 
the IDEA enables a person to obtain redress or 
access a benefit. That inquiry immediately reveals the primacy
of a FAPE in thestatutory scheme. The IDEA’s 
stated purpose and specific commands center on 
ensuring a FAPE for children with disabilities. And the IDEA’s
administrative procedures test whether a school 
has met thisobligation: Any decision by a hearing 
officer on a request for substantive relief “shall” be
“based on a determination of whether the child 
received a free appropriate public education.” 
§1415(f)(3)(E)(i). Accordingly, §1415(l)’s exhaustion rule
hinges on whether a lawsuit seeks relief for the 
denial of a FAPE. If a lawsuit charges such a 
denial, the plaintiff cannot escape §1415(l) merely by bringing
the suit under a statute other than the IDEA. But 
if the remedy sought in a suit brought under a 
different statute is not for the denial of a FAPE,then
exhaustion of the IDEA’s procedures is not required. Pp. 9­13.
(b)
In determining whether a plaintiff seeks relief 
for the denial of a FAPE, what matters is the 
gravamen of the plaintiff’s complaint,setting aside any attempts
at artful pleading. That inquiry makes central 
the plaintiff’s own claims, as §1415(l) 
explicitly requires inasking whether a lawsuit in fact “seeks” relief
available under the IDEA. But examination of a 
plaintiff’s complaint should consider substance, 
not surface: §1415(l) requires exhaustion when the gravamen
of a complaint seeks redress for a school’s 
failure to provide a FAPE, even if not phrased or 
framed in precisely that way. In ad
list end
Syllabus
dressing whether a complaint fits that 
description, a court should attend to the diverse 
means and ends of the statutes covering persons with disabilities.
The IDEA guarantees individually tailored 
educational services for children with 
disabilities, while Title II and §504promise nondiscriminatory access
to public institutions for peoplewith 
disabilities of all ages. That is not to deny 
some overlap in coverage: The same conduct might violate all three
statutes. But still, these statutory differences 
mean that a complaint brought under Title II and 
§504 might instead seek relief for simple discrimination,
irrespective of the IDEA’s FAPE obligation. One 
clue to the gravamen of a complaint can come from 
asking a pair of hypothetical questions.First, could
the plaintiff have brought essentially the same 
claim if the alleged conduct had occurred at a 
public facility that was not aschool? Second, could an adult
at the school have pressed essentiallythe same 
grievance? When the answer to those questions is 
yes, a complaint that does not expressly allege the denial
of a FAPE is alsounlikely to be truly about that 
subject. But when the answer is no, then the 
complaint probably does concern a FAPE. A further sign of
the gravamen of a suit can emerge from the 
history of the proceedings. Prior pursuit of the 
IDEA’s administrative remedies may provide strong evidence
that the substance of a plaintiff’s claim 
concernsthe denial of a FAPE, even if the 
complaint never explicitly uses that term. Pp. 13­18.
2. This case is remanded to the Court of Appeals 
for a proper analysis of whether the gravamen of 
E. F.’s complaint charges, and seeksrelief for, the denial
of a FAPE. The Frys’ complaint alleges only 
dis-ability-based discrimination, without making 
any reference to the adequacy of the special education services
E. F.’s school provided.Instead, the Frys have 
maintained that the school districts infringed
E. F.’s right to equal access—even if their 
actions complied in fullwith the IDEA’s 
requirements. But the possibility remains that thehistory of these
proceedings might suggest something different. 
The parties have not addressed whether the Frys 
initially pursued theIDEA’s administrative remedies, and
the record is cloudy as to the relevant facts. On 
remand, the court below should establish whether 
(or to what extent) the Frys invoked the IDEA’s dispute
resolutionprocess before filing suit. And if the 
Frys started down that road, thecourt should 
decide whether their actions reveal that the gravamen of
their complaint is indeed the denial of a FAPE, 
thus necessitating further exhaustion. Pp. 18­20.
788 F. 3d 622, vacated and remanded.
KAGAN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS,
C. J., and KENNEDY, GINSBURG, BREYER, and SOTOMAYOR, JJ., joined.
FRY v. NAPOLEON COMMUNITY SCHOOLS Syllabus ALITO, 
J., filed an opinion concurring in part and 
concurring in the judgment, in which THOMAS, J., joined.


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That is a good question. Most all of guide/seeing eye dogs are issued to people over the age of 16 and care and diciplin are the blind person’s responsibility. Other types of service / Therapy dogs which are issued to younger children  pose a unique challenge in this area.

Leah Gerlach, M.S.
Rehabilitation Counselor, and Access Technology Specialist
[cid:image002.jpg@01D28D01.A1ED8FB0]
at Deicke House
219 East Cole Avenue
Wheaton, IL 60187
P: 1-630-690-7115 ext. 122
F: 1-630-690-9037
www.spectrios.orghttp://www.spectrios.org/

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From: AERNet [mailto:aernet-bounces@lists.aerbvi.org] On Behalf Of Tamara Greenwood
Sent: Wednesday, February 22, 2017 11:30 AM
To: Mark Richert 4justice@concentric.net
Cc: aernet@lists.aerbvi.org
Subject: Re: [AERNet] excellent unanimous Supreme Court decision about service animals just handed down!

Ok. Now that this topic has been confirmed. Are there any references to guidelines that school districts/day cares/hospitals shall follow to determine what party is responsible for correcting and providing care for the dog throughout the day? Remember, therapy dogs are also considered service animals.

Tamara Greenwood
AER District 5 Representative

On Feb 22, 2017 12:16 PM, "Mark Richert" <4justice@concentric.netmailto:4justice@concentric.net> wrote:
All, in these very strange and mysterious days, it's awesome to see a unanimous Supreme Court decision having to do with an issue we all care so much about. This decision just came out like a couple hours ago, very cool. I'll share the syllabus from the Court's decision below, but the bottom line is that if a school discriminates against a kiddo for using a guide dog/service animal, the parents should be able to go straight to court to enforce the student's rights under ADA and 504 and do not need to exhaust all the administrative procedures you have to satisfy under IDEA. The formatting of the syllabus is a bit funky cuz I just cut and pasted it from the PDF slip opinion.

Mark

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Syllabus
FRY ET VIR, AS NEXT FRIENDS OF MINOR E. F. v. NAPOLEON COMMUNITY SCHOOLS ET AL.
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
No. 15­497. Argued October 31, 2016—Decided February 22, 2017
The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) offers federal funds to States in exchange for a commitment to furnish a “free appropriate public
education” (FAPE) to children with certain disabilities, 20 U. S. C. §1412(a)(1)(A), and establishes formal administrativeprocedures for resolving disputes
between parents and schools concerning the provision of a FAPE. Other federal statutes also protect the interests of children with disabilities, including
Title II of theAmericans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and §504 of the RehabilitationAct. In Smith v. Robinson, 468 U. S. 992, this Court considered the
interaction between those other laws and the IDEA, holding that theIDEA was “the exclusive avenue” through which a child with a disability could challenge
the adequacy of his education. Id., at 1009. Congress responded by passing the Handicapped Children’s Protection Act of 1986, overturning Smith’s preclusion
of non-IDEA claims and adding a carefully defined exhaustion provision. Under that provision, a plaintiff bringing suit under the ADA, the RehabilitationAct,
or similar laws “seeking relief that is also available under [theIDEA]” must first exhaust the IDEA’s administrative procedures. §1415(l).Petitioner E.
F. is a child with a severe form of cerebral palsy; a trained service dog named Wonder assists her with various daily life activities. When E. F.’s parents,
petitioners Stacy and Brent Fry,sought permission for Wonder to join E. F. in kindergarten, officialsat Ezra Eby Elementary School refused. The officials
reasoned that the human aide provided as part of E. F.’s individualized educationprogram rendered the dog superfluous. In response, the Frys removed E.
F. from Ezra Eby and began homeschooling her. They also
Syllabus
filed a complaint with the Department of Education’s Office for CivilRights (OCR), claiming that the exclusion of E. F.’s service animal violated her rights
under Title II and §504. OCR agreed, and school officials invited E. F. to return to Ezra Eby with Wonder. But the Frys, concerned about resentment from
school officials, instead enrolled
E. F. in a different school that welcomed the service dog. The Frysthen filed this suit in federal court against Ezra Eby’s local and regional school districts
and principal (collectively, the school districts),alleging that they violated Title II and §504 and seeking declaratoryand monetary relief. The District
Court granted the school districts’ motion to dismiss the suit, holding that §1415(l) required the Frys tofirst exhaust the IDEA’s administrative procedures.
The Sixth Circuit affirmed, reasoning that §1415(l) applies whenever a plaintiff’s alleged harms are “educational” in nature.
Held:

1. Exhaustion of the IDEA’s administrative procedures is unnecessary where the gravamen of the plaintiff’s suit is something otherthan the denial of the
   IDEA’s core guarantee of a FAPE. Pp. 9­18.
   list of 2 items
   (a)
   The language of §1415(l) compels exhaustion when a plaintiffseeks “relief” that is “available” under the IDEA. Establishing the scope of §1415(l), then,
   requires identifying the circumstances inwhich the IDEA enables a person to obtain redress or access a benefit. That inquiry immediately reveals the primacy
   of a FAPE in thestatutory scheme. The IDEA’s stated purpose and specific commands center on ensuring a FAPE for children with disabilities. And the IDEA’s
   administrative procedures test whether a school has met thisobligation: Any decision by a hearing officer on a request for substantive relief “shall” be
   “based on a determination of whether the child received a free appropriate public education.” §1415(f)(3)(E)(i). Accordingly, §1415(l)’s exhaustion rule
   hinges on whether a lawsuit seeks relief for the denial of a FAPE. If a lawsuit charges such a denial, the plaintiff cannot escape §1415(l) merely by bringing
   the suit under a statute other than the IDEA. But if the remedy sought in a suit brought under a different statute is not for the denial of a FAPE,then
   exhaustion of the IDEA’s procedures is not required. Pp. 9­13.
   (b)
   In determining whether a plaintiff seeks relief for the denial of a FAPE, what matters is the gravamen of the plaintiff’s complaint,setting aside any attempts
   at artful pleading. That inquiry makes central the plaintiff’s own claims, as §1415(l) explicitly requires inasking whether a lawsuit in fact “seeks” relief
   available under the IDEA. But examination of a plaintiff’s complaint should consider substance, not surface: §1415(l) requires exhaustion when the gravamen
   of a complaint seeks redress for a school’s failure to provide a FAPE, even if not phrased or framed in precisely that way. In ad
   list end
   Syllabus
   dressing whether a complaint fits that description, a court should attend to the diverse means and ends of the statutes covering persons with disabilities.
   The IDEA guarantees individually tailored educational services for children with disabilities, while Title II and §504promise nondiscriminatory access
   to public institutions for peoplewith disabilities of all ages. That is not to deny some overlap in coverage: The same conduct might violate all three
   statutes. But still, these statutory differences mean that a complaint brought under Title II and §504 might instead seek relief for simple discrimination,
   irrespective of the IDEA’s FAPE obligation. One clue to the gravamen of a complaint can come from asking a pair of hypothetical questions.First, could
   the plaintiff have brought essentially the same claim if the alleged conduct had occurred at a public facility that was not aschool? Second, could an adult
   at the school have pressed essentiallythe same grievance? When the answer to those questions is yes, a complaint that does not expressly allege the denial
   of a FAPE is alsounlikely to be truly about that subject. But when the answer is no, then the complaint probably does concern a FAPE. A further sign of
   the gravamen of a suit can emerge from the history of the proceedings. Prior pursuit of the IDEA’s administrative remedies may provide strong evidence
   that the substance of a plaintiff’s claim concernsthe denial of a FAPE, even if the complaint never explicitly uses that term. Pp. 13­18.
2. This case is remanded to the Court of Appeals for a proper analysis of whether the gravamen of E. F.’s complaint charges, and seeksrelief for, the denial
   of a FAPE. The Frys’ complaint alleges only dis-ability-based discrimination, without making any reference to the adequacy of the special education services
   E. F.’s school provided.Instead, the Frys have maintained that the school districts infringed
   E. F.’s right to equal access—even if their actions complied in fullwith the IDEA’s requirements. But the possibility remains that thehistory of these
   proceedings might suggest something different. The parties have not addressed whether the Frys initially pursued theIDEA’s administrative remedies, and
   the record is cloudy as to the relevant facts. On remand, the court below should establish whether (or to what extent) the Frys invoked the IDEA’s dispute
   resolutionprocess before filing suit. And if the Frys started down that road, thecourt should decide whether their actions reveal that the gravamen of
   their complaint is indeed the denial of a FAPE, thus necessitating further exhaustion. Pp. 18­20.
   788 F. 3d 622, vacated and remanded.
   KAGAN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS,
   C. J., and KENNEDY, GINSBURG, BREYER, and SOTOMAYOR, JJ., joined.
   FRY v. NAPOLEON COMMUNITY SCHOOLS Syllabus ALITO, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, in which THOMAS, J., joined.

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